Abstract: Aldrich-McKelvey scaling is a powerful method that corrects for differentialitem functioning (DIF) in estimating the positions of political stimuli (e.g., parties and candidates) and survey respondents along a latent policy dimension from issue scale data. DIF arises when respondents interpret issue scales (like the standard liberal-conservative scale) differently and distort their placements of the stimuli and themselves. We develop a Bayesian implementation of the classical maximum likelihood Aldrich-McKelvey scaling method that overcomes some important shortcomings in the classical procedure. We then apply this method to study citizens' ideological preferences and perceptions using data from the 2004-2012 American National Election Studies and the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. Our findings indicate that DIF biases self-placements on the liberal-conservative scale in a way that understates the extent of polarization in the contemporary American electorate and that citizens have remarkably accurate perceptions of the ideological positions of Senators and Senate candidates.
Introduction
It is difficult to overstate the extent to which our knowledge of the political world has benefitted from survey research. Surveys like the American National Election Studies have made it possible for countless scholars to investigate questions of vital importance to the functioning of our democratic society. For example, do citizens possess spatial awarenessthat is, an understanding of their position relative to other political figures on important dimensions of political competition? If citizens do possess this spatial awareness, then at the individual level, citizens can use this information to make informed decisions about their own political futures including holding current officeholders accountable for perceived policy-oriented transgressions. Further, individual preferences can provide a sense of the distribution of preferences in the aggregate. Reliable information of this sort is required to assess the extent and character of popular representation. One of the most salient questions in contemporary American politics concerns the extent to which the mass public can be characterized as ideologically polarized. Notably, Fiorina, Abrams and Pope (2011) have used survey data to argue that the American public has remained centrist in the aggregate while their political representatives have become decidedly non-centrist (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2006) . Unfortunately, survey responses can obscure, rather than illuminate, the true nature of the political world. Both Brady (1985) and King et al. (2004) have identified a problem with issue scales (the main source of data for answering these types of questions) called differential item-functioning (DIF). DIF (or interpersonal incomparability) arises when respondents interpret and answer survey items such as issue scales differently. Two respondents with the same opinion may nonetheless place themselves at different positions on the scale, or two respondents with different opinions may locate themselves at the same position. While this problem may seem to be largely methodological in nature, we show below that it has some important substantive implications. In particular, we might expect that many respondents place both themselves and their preferred candidate/party in the middle of the scale while pushing stimuli they dislike toward the extremes. For instance, a conservative respondent may place the Democratic Party on the far left edge of the scale, while a liberal respondent will be more likely to perceive the Democratic Party and herself as centrist. This would have the effect of making the electorate artificially appear less polarized. DIF of this form also limits comparability between respondents across ideologically disparate electoral or geographic units like states and hinders our ability to evaluate the accuracy of citizens' ideological perceptions of their representatives. Aldrich and McKelvey's (1977) pathbreaking solution to the problem of DIF is to treat raw placements as linear distortions of the "true" positions of the stimuli (e.g., political parties and candidates). By estimating each respondent's perceptual distortion parameters (the intercept/"shift" and weight/"stretch" terms), it is possible to recover the underlying locations of the stimuli as well as the respondents (if self-placement questions are included in the survey) on a common latent dimension from issue scale data. The Aldrich-McKelvey (A-M) method was one of the first statistical scaling procedures based upon the spatial (geometric) theory of choice and judgment. Nearly forty years after its development, political scientists continue to employ A-M scaling to study a variety of political contexts (e.g., Saiegh, 2009; Hollibaugh, Rothenberg and Rulison, 2013; Lo, Proksch and Gschwend, 2014) . Gary King and Jonathan Wand have also introduced a DIF-correction method based on anchoring vignettes that is equivalent to a nonparametric version of the A-M model (King and Wand, 2007; Wand, 2013) . However, A-M scaling has been an underutilized tool in general the estimation of spatial models of public opinion and in particular to answer the important questions posed above. In part, oversight of the A-M scaling method can be attributed to the technical complexities of actually running the classical maximum likelihood (ML) A-M procedure, which was originally written in FORTRAN code and has only recently been made available as an R function in the 1 "Anchoring vignettes" are stimuli that are familiar to all of the respondents. These can be real (e.g., the Republican Party or President Obama) or fictional. For example, Bakker, Jolly, Polk and Poole (2014) ask expert informants to place fictional parties with hypothetical platforms on a left-right scale, and use these placements to bridge across European countries.
basicspace package . There are also some important limitations to classical A-M scaling. First, it does not allow for the inclusion of individuals with missing responses. This becomes problematic not only because of high rates of missing data in public opinion surveys, but also when it becomes necessary to "bridge" across data from different respondent groups (e.g., nations or congressional districts) and/or time periods since missing data will necessarily be present. Second, uncertainty bounds for the stimuli positions are not directly estimated but can be approximated via bootstrapping. More importantly, though, there is no satisfactory way to estimate uncertainty in the individual distortion parameters and, hence, in the respondent ideal points using classical A-M scaling.
In this paper, we address these deficiencies by developing a Bayesian implementation of the A-M scaling mod el. In this setup, missing data are easily accommodated and Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods produce more realistic measures of uncertainty (i.e., 95% credible intervals) for both the stimuli and the distortion parameters. These measures facilitate the appropriate use of A-M results in outside models by allowing the researcher to incorporate uncertainty inherent in estimates of latent variables. Our adaptation preserves the underlying A-M model while providing a more attractive means of estimation. This innovation allows us to provide more rigorous and appropriate answers to the questions posed above and will hopefully allow other scholars using issue scale data to do the same.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first elaborate on the problem of DIF, how it systematically biases survey responses, and how the A-M model solves this problem. We then develop a version of this model that is akin to a re-indexed Bayesian factor model (see Quinn, 2004 and Jackman, 2009 ) that can be estimated using standard MCMC methods. The subsequent sections apply the method to two important questions in the study of American politics. First, we present evidence that respondents bias their liberal-conservative ideological scale placements such that they place themselves and their preferred candidate(s) near the middle while pushing opposing candidates to the extremes. In Sections 4 and 5, we demonstrate that this bias has important substantive implications for the study of citi-zens' ideological preferences and perceptions. First, we show that DIF understates the true extent of polarization in liberal-conservative self-placement data. Second, we employ the Bayesian A-M method to address the problem of comparability in respondent perceptions across states. Correcting for DIF allows us to make valid cross-state comparisons of respondents' ideological perceptions of Senators and Senatorial candidates and assess how they compare with alternative measures based on roll call votes and campaign contributions.
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Section 6 concludes with an assessment of how Bayesian A-M scaling can contribute to the field of ideal point estimation and scaling methodology.
Differential Item Functioning in Survey Responses and the Aldrich-McKelvey Solution
Placing oneself and political stimuli like parties or candidates on an issue scale is a task of perception, and there are many ways in which survey respondents' perceptions can be systematically distorted. First, ideological centrists and extremists view the political world differently, even if they agree on the ordering of stimuli on a policy dimension. Extremists have more intense, sharply peaked utility functions and perceive greater distance between themselves and the alternatives (Sherif and Hovland, 1961; Carroll et al., 2013) . Consequently, ideological extremists who view all parties or candidates as insufficiently liberal or conservative should be inclined to push the stimuli toward one end of the scale. Consider, for example, a far left activist and and a far right activist. Both might agree that President Obama is to the left of Mitt Romney. But the far left activist may perceive Romney to be on the far-right and Obama to be moderate or even slightly conservative. Conversely, the far right activist is likely to view Obama as extremely liberal and Romney as a centrist.
Second, because the term "moderate" has a positive connotation in politics (i.e., it implies being reasonable, sensible, objective, etc.), we expect that respondents will be more likely to use that term or position to describe themselves and their preferred candidate and party, even if those stimuli are decidedly non-centrist. There has been a considerable amount of work that has examined why Americans favor the "conservative" over the "liberal" label (e.g., Free and Cantril, 1967; Ellis and Stimson, 2012) , but less attention has been paid to whether social desirability bias leads to overuse of the middle position of issue scales. We hypothesize that many respondents place themselves and their preferred candidate/party near the middle of the scale while pushing the opposing candidate/party closer to either of the ends of the scale.
Finally, respondents also distort their issue scale placements by reversing the ordering of stimuli. This would include, for instance, placing the Republican Party to the left of the Democratic Party. This behavior is concentrated among those with low levels of political sophistication (Palfrey and Poole, 1987) , although its frequency (both on the liberalconservative scale and several specific issue scales) has declined over recent decades (Levendusky, 2009 ). Aldrich and McKelvey (1977) develop a scaling method that diagnoses and corrects for these types of distortions by modeling respondents' placements as a linear function of the true location of the stimuli and two individual-specific transformation parameters. The first parameter (the α or intercept term) allows for shifts in the reported placements to the left or right. The second parameter (the β or weight term) expands or contracts the reported placements on the scale, reversing them when β is negative. Hence, respondents with negative weight terms (i.e., β i < 0) possess lower levels of political information than respondents with positive weights.
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The A-M model is presented in equation (1). Let z ij be the reported placement of stimulus 3 We provide the results of several tests in support of this claim in the Supporting Information/ j (j = 1, . . . , q) by individual i (i = 1, . . . , n):
where ζ j is the true position of stimuli j, α i is the intercept/"shift" term, β i is the weight or "stretch" term, and u ij satisfies the usual Gauss-Markov assumptions of zero mean, homoscedasticity, and independence (Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977, p. 113 ).
As noted above, the A-M model has traditionally been estimated in a maximum likelihood (ML) framework, which has two important deficiencies. First, it does not estimate uncertainty in the point estimates. Though a bootstrapping scheme can be used to develop uncertainty bounds for the stimuli estimates, it remains infeasible to calculate uncertainty estimates for the individual distortion parameters. As we show in the next section, this precludes the estimation of uncertainty bounds for the respondent ideal points. Second, the ML method does not allow for the inclusion of respondents with missing values. Not only does this waste a lot of usable data (e.g., a respondent who places all but one of the stimuli), but it also prevents the use of "bridged" issue scale data in which respondents are asked to place only some of the stimuli. For instance, respondents in different states or congressional districts may be asked to place their representatives as well as some common stimuli (e.g., the Democratic Party) on an issue scale. Theoretically, the common stimuli can be used to bridge across regions or time to place all of the stimuli on a common scale, and this has been implemented in other applications (Poole, 2005; Shor and McCarty, 2011; Bakker, Jolly, Polk and Poole, 2014) . However, because respondents are not asked to place all of the stimuli, missing values will be present for every respondent and the existing method cannot accommodate this data structure. These issues motivate our development of a Bayesian method of estimating the A-M scaling model.
The Bayesian Aldrich-McKelvey Scaling Model
Rather than employ a loss function to develop a Bayesian implementation of the A-M model, we instead estimate a variation of a Bayesian factor model (e.g., Quinn, 2004; Jackman, 2009, chap. 9) . In the standard factor model set-up, the latent variable or factor is indexed by individual whereas the factor loadings are held constant across all observations. The A-M procedure, however, reverses this indexing. That is, the factor loadings are allowed to vary across individuals whereas the latent variable is held constant. This follows directly from the discussion above in that the true positions of the stimuli are the same for all respondents whereas the parameters that map the respondents' perceived placements of the stimuli to the true placements are specific to the individual.
While Aldrich and McKelvey (1977) solve for ζ j first and subsequently calculate the individual transformation parameters α i and β i , in the Bayesian framework we can estimate both quantities simultaneously. As Jackman (2000) describes, in Bayesian estimation all unknown quantities are treated in the same manner. Once the model is specified, we sample from the joint posterior distribution of all unknown parameters, whether they are missing data values, regression parameters, latent variable scores, or any other unknown. In our model, we sample from the joint posterior for the individual transformation parameters and the true stimuli positions. Identification of this model is achieved through the priors on the unknown parameters.
4 Given that we sample directly from the posterior distribution of the unknowns, it is trivial to compute standard errors for these estimates.
The Bayesian A-M model assumes that the z ij (the perceived location of stimulus j by individual i) are distributed in the following manner:
We employ non-informative uniform priors for the individual transformation parameters α i and β i :
Standard normal priors are used for the estimates of the stimuli positions (ζ j ). The polarity of the scale can be set by constraining a liberal stimulus to lie between -1.1 and -0.9 [i.e., N (0, 1)T (−1.1, −0.9)] and a conservative stimulus to lie between 0.9 and 1.1. This is adapted from the standard −1/+1 constraint that is sufficient for identification (Clinton, Jackman and Rivers, 2004) , but also allows for uncertainty in the point estimates of these stimuli.
Finally, unique stimuli and respondent error variances are estimated to allow for heteroskedastic error. Diffuse inverse Gamma priors are used for both the stimuli and respondentspecific precision terms (τ j and τ i , respectively). Inverse Gamma hyperpriors are also placed on the shape and scale parameters of the inverse Gamma priors for the τ i terms. This has the practical effect of introducing exchangeability between the τ i parameters.
In the examples used in this paper, MCMC estimation of the model is conducted using JAGS (Just Another Gibbs Sampler) and the R package rjags (Plummer, 2003 (Plummer, , 2013 . We require that respondents provide placements of at least three stimuli to be included in the analysis. In each case, we run two chains, discarding the first 50, 000 iterations as a burnin period and summarizing the results of the remaining 10, 000 iterations with a thinning interval of 10. The chains show strong evidence of convergence according to the GelmanRubin diagnostic, the Geweke diagnostic, and the unimodality of the posterior distributions.
Finally, equation (12) uses respondents' self-placements (z i(self ) ) and estimated distortion parameters (α i and β i ) to calculate their ideal point (x i ) in the same metric as the estimated stimuli positions:
In the Bayesian framework, this means that we take successive draws from the posterior densities of α i and β i to calculate a distribution for individual i's ideal point. This allows uncertainty in the estimates of α i and β i to flow through to the ideal point estimates, another advantage of the Bayesian A-M procedure. Note in equation (12) that lim
= ∞, and so we use the median value as the point estimate of the respondent positions since the median will be more robust to long tails produced when posterior draws of β i are very close to 0. We next more systematically consider the relationship between respondents' α values and their ideological and partisan preferences. First, Figure 1 shows the distribution of respondents' mean α values across partisan and ideological groups in the 2012 ANES. As we would expect, the α means of Democrats and self-identified liberals tend to be positive (meaning that they overuse the conservative end of scale) while the α means of Republicans and self-identified conservatives tend to be negative (meaning that they overuse the liberal end of the scale). 5 The importance of this result is that, in most cases, liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans are understating their own ideological extremism in their selfplacements.
It is also important to note from Figure 1 that while the α estimates for independents and self-identified moderates are centered at 0, there is also high variance. That is, there are a considerable number of respondents in both groups with non-negligible positive or negative α means whose own ideological placements need to be shifted to the left or right. These are illusory moderates. They may perceive themselves as moderate, but their ratings of political stimuli calls their self-placements into question. While Treier and Hillygus (2009) have argued that moderate identification can mask underlying cross-pressures between liberal and conservative attitudes on economic and social issues, our findings indicate that it may also hide more extreme positions on a single liberal-conservative dimension.
Of course, Figure 1 is subject to the criticism that we are using a measure (ideological self-placement) that is itself biased by DIF to diagnose DIF. To address this problem, we turn to data from the 2010 CCES to develop an alternative measure of ideological position and examine its relationship to respondents' mean α values. Table 3 reports the results of separate OLS regressions of respondent mean α values onto ideological self-placements and the measure based on roll call votes using the 2010 CCES data. As in Figure 1 and consistent with the hypothesized relationship, both ideological variables exert a negative effect on the α term. In fact, respondent ideology as measured using their roll call vote preferences has an even stronger relationship with the mean α values than the raw self-placements. This provides strong evidence that respondents' ideological positions systematically influence their issue scale placements, with more liberal respondents pushing stimuli too far rightward and conservative respondents doing just the opposite.
Moreover, 34% of self-identified moderates (570 / 1663) are in the most liberal or most conservative quartiles of the ideological measure constructed from the roll call votes.
Re-Considering the Distribution of Citizens' Ideological Preferences
We have thus far shown that respondents bias their placements on issue scales in systematic ways that can be diagnosed and corrected for by A-M scaling. This section proceeds with an assessment of how DIF affects survey respondents' self-placements on the standard liberalconservative scale and our use of this data to analyze the distribution of mass ideological preferences. In particular, this data has obvious relevance to the study of polarization in the contemporary American electorate and is frequently used to examine whether citizens have followed elites and become more extreme in their own policy preferences. A quick review of this data suggests not: since 1972, the modal response to the American National Election Some, most notably Fiorina, Abrams and Pope (2011), have used this data to argue that the American public has remained centrist in the face of intense elite polarization (see also Fiorina and Abrams, 2008 and DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson, 1996 . Others have pointed out that the distribution of respondents becomes more bimodal when isolating actual voters or politically informed/engaged citizens (e.g., Palfrey and Poole, 1987; Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008; Abramowitz, 2010; Lauderdale, 2013) . These types of respondents have more polarized preferences as well as greater influence in the political arena. For the public as a whole, though, self-placements on most of these issue scales-particularly the liberal-conservative scale-follow an approximate bell curve pattern, and this has important implications for measuring polarization in the mass public. Hetherington and Weiler (2009, p. 19) , for example, write that:
Fiorina quite convincingly shows that Americans' issue preferences have been and remain generally moderate (see also Evans 2003) . A key piece of his evidence is the National Election Study's (NES) ideological self-placement question. When people are asked to place themselves on a 7-point scale from extremely liberal at one end to extremely conservative at the other with moderate, middle of the road at the midpoint, about 50 percent of Americans either characterize themselves as moderate or are unable to place themselves on the scale.
What is left out of this discussion, however, is an analysis of how DIF biases respondents' self-placements on the liberal-conservative scale. Our findings in the previous section clearly lead to the hypothesis that DIF should understate the true level of ideological polarization in the electorate. Ideologues and partisans tend to push stimuli (including themselves) too far to the opposite end of the scale, and many self-identified moderates are not true centrists. values, meaning that they correctly placed liberal stimuli to the left of conservative stimuli.
As discussed in the previous section, we use the positive weight threshold to filter respondents who meet a baseline level of political information Both distributions of Bayesian A-M ideal point estimates-all respondents and only those with positive weights-exhibit greater polarization than the raw self-placement data. The peaks of the distributions are far flatter and extend outward to the major party presidential candidate point estimates (shown with the "O" and "R" labels at the bottom). Indeed, a little less than half (44%) of respondents have estimated ideal points more extreme than Obama or Romney. We might more accurately characterize these distributions are trimodal, with peaks at the center and around each of the estimated candidate positions (e.g., Downey and Huffman, 2001) . Of course, we should be cautious since there is uncertainty in the these point estimates, but at the very least these results shed doubt on the common practice of using raw self-placement data to measure polarization. The ideological center appears to hollow out once we account for DIF.
Indeed, the ideological distribution of respondents with positive weights clearly shows the greatest amount of polarization, with many moderates disappearing once we remove those who confuse the liberal and conservative labels as applied to the parties and presidential candidates. This result is very much in line with the findings of Palfrey and Poole (1987) and Abramowitz (2010): as we focus on more informed and engaged segments of the electorate, we find higher levels of ideological polarization. These are the citizens with the loudest voice in American politics, and Bayesian A-M scaling reveals the extent of their polarization.
As a final test, we adopt Levendusky and Pope's (2011) approach of measuring polarization with the overlap coefficient. The overlap coefficient measures the overlap or shared area between two distributions; for example, between Republicans and Democrats on an ideological dimension. Given two probability densities f and g, the overlap coefficient is defined as
and ranges between 0 (no overlap) to 1 (complete overlap), so that lower values indicate higher attitudinal polarization.
We estimate the overlap coefficient using the nonparametric estimator (∆ 4 ) 8 in Equation 14 from Schmid and Schmidt (2006) and implemented in the R package overlap (Mered-ith and Ridout, 2013):
Our goal is to compare the overlap between voters supporting each of the two major We use a bootstrapping approach to estimate 95% confidence intervals for the overlap point estimates for the raw liberal-conservative self-placements, sampling with replacement over 1,000 trials and then calculating the standard deviations of the series of point estimates. We aggregate uncertainty in the Bayesian A-M ideal points to develop 95% credible intervals for the overlap coefficients from these estimates. A random draw is taken from the posterior distribution of each respondent's ideal point, an overlap score is computed for these draws, and the process is repeated 1,000 times. 9 This gives us a distribution of overlap coefficients, for which we calculate the 95% credible interval. The results are summarized in Figure 3 .
Across all years, the overlap between party identifiers (with leaners) and voters of the Democratic/Republican presidential candidates is greater according to raw liberal-conservative self-placements than the Bayesian A-M ideal point estimates. That is, after accounting for DIF using Bayesian A-M scaling, voters are more polarized (less overlap) than when using raw self-placement data. In all cases, the difference in overlap coefficients between the raw self-placements and the Bayesian A-M estimates is statistically significant at conventional levels. The differences between the two sets of overlap coefficients are also substantively large, in no case less than 0.09 (or about an 18% decrease in overlap from the raw self-placement data to the Bayesian A-M ideal point estimates). It is also noteworthy that the overlap point estimates show the most pronounced drop in 2012-the most recent year studied.
9 Extreme draws that are greater or less than 10/-10 are excluded from the analysis. Hence, the vast majority of policy outcomes in Congress and state legislatures can be explained by the distribution of their members along the ideological spectrum. In order for voters to hold representatives maximally accountable, then, they must be able to distinguish between political actors on an ideological metric.
A number of classic works-namely, Miller and Stokes (1963) we might conclude that ideological nuance is beyond the reach of most citizens.
However, a more recent stream of research has a more optimistic take on citizens' ability to gauge the ideological positions of legislators and candidates. First, survey research shows that citizens have a better grasp of their representatives' roll call vote behavior than commonly assumed (Ansolabehere and Jones, 2010), especially on salient roll call votes (Nyhan et al., 2012) . Second, moderate congressional candidates outperform extreme ones at the ballot box, ceteris paribus (Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart, 2001; Bonica, 2014) . Political polarization has also brought ideology to the forefront of American politics, making ideological terms and labels more accessible and producing greater recognition of policy differences between the Democratic and Republican parties (Levendusky, 2009; Jacoby, 1995) .
Certainly, the fact that so many issues now collapse onto a single liberal-conservative dimen-sion (Layman and Carsey, 2002) facilitates use of this dimension in the mass public. For instance, a voter who knows a candidate holds an extreme position on a visible, "easy" issue like abortion can reasonably infer that legislator holds strong liberal or conservative stances on a host of other issues. This was not the case as recently as twenty years ago (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) .
Finally, studies of campaign effects have shown that voters become better informed about candidates' policy stances over the course of political campaigns (Franklin, 1991; Alvarez, 1997 )-including statewide party primaries (Hirano et al., 2014) -and in competitive political environments (Jones, 2013) . Voters seem to balance dual information flows from positive and negative/attack advertising in campaigns to develop more precise inferences about the candidates' policy stances (Geer and Vavreck, 2014) . Most importantly though, Jacoby and
Armstrong (2014) find that citizens use information about the ideological positions of political actors to make affective evaluations (i.e., using feeling thermometers) about them.
Given these results, we hypothesize that respondents will be able to ideologically differentiate between Senators and Senatorial candidates of the same party and, especially, of different parties.
We test this hypothesis using survey data from the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). The 2010 CCES respondents were asked to place themselves, four national stimuli (President Obama, the Democratic and Republican parties, and the Tea Party) on a seven-point liberal-conservative scale. As in Section 3, we randomly select with replacement 200 respondents from each state. We analyze this data using Bayesian A-M scaling, using the four national stimuli to "bridge" across the states. This type of data cannot be analyzed using classical (ML) A-M scaling since respondents with missing data are excluded from the analysis and every respondent will necessarily have missing placements (e.g., a
California respondent cannot rate a Senate candidate in New Hampshire) in this setup.
The demonstrated that citizens are largely unknowledgeable about the issue positions of political elites, they also appear to be able to piece together enough information to approximate the positions of legislators and candidates in ideological space (Hinich and Pollard, 1981; Hinich and Munger, 1994) . With a single liberal-conservative dimension structuring the behavior of elite actors in contemporary American politics, democratic accountability requires the electorate to operate in this space. Our results provide an optimistic assessment of their ability to do so.
Finally, we compare the BAM scores and the mean placements in order to assess the influence of DIF on the aggregate state estimates. The two sets of scores are highly similar, but there are some differences in the intra-party correlations. More importantly, though, the correlation between the BAM scores and DW-NOMINATE scores (overall and among Democratic stimuli) is higher than the correlation between the mean placements and the DW-NOMINATE scores. Though mean placements provide a close approximation to the BAM scores, correcting for DIF provides us with a more optimistic assessment of citizens' abilities to judge the ideological positions of political stimuli.
It would be reasonable to expect that citizens develop ideological profiles of political stimuli based on both their roll call votes and other factors that also influence donors to contribute to them. As Bonica (2014) Table 4 , with additional models isolating Democratic and Republican stimuli. The results indicate that DW-NOMINATE scores exert a larger and consistently significant effect than the CF scores on citizens' ideological perceptions of the selected political stimuli, both overall and within each of the parties. Of course, even though DW-NOMINATE scores are based solely on roll call votes, we should be cautious about attributing the effect of DW-NOMINATE scores on the BAM estimates to roll call voting specifically. Citizens may be able to use general position-taking behavior (Mayhew, 1974) to arrive at an approximation of a legislator's roll call voting record. Some of this is behavior is captured separately by both DW-NOMINATE and CF scores. In addition, a little less than half of the total variance in the BAM scores remains unexplained in the separate Democratic and Republican models and is attributable to some combination of random error and other factors not captured by either external measure of ideology. More work is needed, but the degree to which citizens' perceptions of the ideological positions of legislators correspond to their actual voting history remains striking.
Discussion
Scholars have long recognized the prevalence of interpersonal incomparability or DIF-a problem that arises when respondents interpret and answer survey items in different waysin public opinion data (Brady, 1985; King et al., 2004; Bakker, Jolly, Polk and Poole, 2014) .
DIF can have important substantive implications. As we have shown in this paper, this includes biasing our understanding of ideological polarization in the contemporary American electorate or limiting the comparability of respondents' placements of legislators and candidates across states.
The A-M scaling method has been an effective remedy for the problem of DIF, but has been under-utilized in political science. This owes in part to some limitations of the classical (maximum likelihood) method; in particular, the absence of reliable uncertainty measures and the requirement that respondents place all of the stimuli to be included in the scaling.
The Bayesian implementation of the A-M scaling model that we have presented in this paper addresses these issues, as missing data is accommodated and measures of uncertainty are easily ascertained and interpreted via the posterior densities of the parameters.
We hope that the development of Bayesian A-M scaling will spark renewed interest in applying the A-M model to analyze public opinion or other types of survey data. As we have detailed, the problem of DIF is especially acute when studying polarization in the mass electorate. Many respondents skew the space leftward or rightward, often placing placing themselves and their preferred candidate/party too close to the middle of the scale and/or pushing the opposing candidate/party too far toward the extremes of the scale. Once we account for this phenomenon and estimate corrected ideal points for the respondents, the contemporary American electorate appears to be considerably more ideologically polarized than would be inferred by simply looking at the distribution of raw self-placements on the liberal-conservative scale.
We do not mean to assert that our findings are a silver bullet that the contemporary The implication that political elites and the electorate effectively communicate over a single ideological dimension (Hinich and Munger, 1994; Aldrich and Freeze, 2011 with the benefit that the individual distortion parameters (and therefore, the respondent ideal points) are more precisely estimated as additional stimuli are included.
We think other research opportunities abound using estimates of stimuli ideological positions from respondent placements. For example, while the relationship between the Bayesian A-M stimuli estimates and external measures of ideology (the DW-NOMINATE and CF scores) appears to be strong, it is not perfect. Why are some stimuli perceived to be more or less ideologically extreme than is indicated by their legislative record or contributor behavior? Are these the deviations random noise or the result of ideological maneuvering?
Are placements more accurate (and polarized) during campaign seasons? The results from Bayesian A-M scaling can be used to address these and other questions critical to democratic accountability. 
